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Abstract
In recent years, both microfinance institutions (MFIs) and banks across the world have
been converging towards the financing of small enterprises with high financing needs. This
paper scrutinizes whether banks and MFIs compete each other as a result of recent transfor-
mations in both industries. In doing so, we study whether the loan strategy of a microfinance
institution is shaped by the local presence of a bank. Specifically, we investigate whether bank
proximity influences loan conditions provided by one of the largest microfinance institutions in
Madagascar. We employ an original panel dataset of 32,374 loans granted to 14,834 borrowers
over the period 2008-2014. We find that the closer a bank is located to a given MFI borrower,
the larger the loan obtained and the less collateral required. These results are insensitive to
several robustness tests for possible endogeneity of distance, sample selection issue, and alter-
native specifications. In addition, findings are stronger for larger and more established (older)
firms in line with our hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Limited access to formal credit is a major growth constraint for developing economies,
especially for small firms (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006) and microenterprises (De Mel
et al., 2008; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; Banerjee and Duflo, 2014). Since the 1970s,
microfinance has emerged as a powerful tool to reach borrowers excluded from the formal
financial system (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2010). Microfinance can be viewed as a
response to market failures in capital markets, filling the gap between money-lenders
who charge usurious interest rates and commercial banks1 who are unwilling to provide
financing to people in poverty. This view holds that microfinance institutions (MFIs) and
commercial banks operate in two segmented markets. MFIs target low-income people and
entrepreneurs excluded from bank financing due to a lack of collateral or insufficiently
sized financing needs.
However this commonly held view of dually segmented financial markets has recently
been challenged by new strategies developed by both MFIs and commercial banks. On
the one side, a number of MFIs have adopted a ”scaling-up” process and begun to de-
velop their range of services to match the growing financial needs of small businesses.
This ”upscaling” strategy has resulted in MFIs targeting larger firms and more aﬄuent
borrowers. Several microfinance institutions have changed their legal status from NGO
to shareholder-owned financial entity and, in extreme cases, some MFIs have transformed
themselves into commercial banks (e.g., Prodem in Bolivia, Bandhan in India and Micro-
cred in Madagascar). A recent but growing body of literature has investigated whether
these changes have induced a drift in the historical mission of MFIs, without providing a
clear answer (Armenda´riz and Szafarz, 2011). A less discussed phenomenon is that some
commercial banks have begun to target smaller firms by developing special products or
acquiring microfinance institutions. This ”downscaling” process began in Latin America
in the 1990’s and has since experienced significant growth in other areas of the world
(Ferrari and Jaffrin, 2006).
Our aim is to examine whether banks and MFIs continue to operate in two segmented
1For the reminder of this article, the terms ”commercial bank” and ”bank” are used interchangeably
to refer to formal lenders (i.e., registered financial entities) which have not historically offered financial
products or used lending techniques designed specifically to target poor populations.
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markets or have begun to compete for some of the same clients. If both financial in-
termediaries focus on two different types of borrowers, we could expect that changes in
the banking market to have a limited impact on MFI’ operations, and vice versa. How-
ever, if both types of lenders clients overlap, changes in either industry would likely to
affect the other. As a consequence, policy-driven shocks (such as changes in regulation)
or economic-driven shocks (such as the entry of new actors) in one industry could have
unexpected consequences for the other.
In order to test our hypothesis, we investigate whether competitive pressure induced
by the proximity of a commercial bank to MFI clients affects loans granted to them by
one of the largest MFIs in Madagascar.2 Madagascar is a perfect testing ground for our
study question because some banks there have recently adopted ”downscaling” strategies
and because our partner MFI initiated its upscaling strategy few years ago. At least
three commercial banks in Madagascar, including the largest one (Bank of Africa) and
a former MFI (Microcred), have developed specific products for micro- and small firms.
Meanwhile, our partner MFI provides individual loans with an upper-limit of $40,000.
However, in reality, it continues to offer mainly micro-loans (in 2014, half of the loans
it granted were below $500 and less than 2.5% of loans exceeded $5,000). Investigating
whether our partner’s business strategy has shifted by bank’s presence gives us initial
insight into how MFIs may react to banking development in a low-income countries.
We use a rich data set containing information on 32,374 loans (14,834 borrowers) from
2008 to 2014. We argue that MFIs and banks compete if loan conditions offered by our
partner MFI are affected by bank proximity to MFI clients. We consider two measures of
loan conditions, namely loan amount and collateral requirements.3 In line with recent lit-
erature on the role of distance in lending (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena,
2005), we assume that the distance between an MFI client and the closest commercial
bank branch is a good measure of competitive pressure induced by the bank’s presence.
Indeed, the probability of an MFI client being wooed by a commercial bank increases as
the distance between the client and commercial bank decreases, due to transportation
and informational costs.
2Due to confidentiality, we are not allowed to divulge our partner’s name.
3Loan officers may discretionarily determine the loan amount and collateral requirements but cannot
set interest rates and maturity, as discussed in the following.
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We study whether credit conditions offered by our partner’s MFI to its clients are
shaped by the presence of a bank in the vicinity. A major issue of identification occurs
because borrowers and banks do not randomly locate. Our identification strategy is
based on the inclusion of borrower fixed effects.4 Adding fixed effects allows us to focus on
within variation and to avoid all bias induced by time-invariant unobserved characteristics
that affect location and credit terms. In other words, we investigate whether the credit
condition dynamic is shaped by a change in distance between the borrower and the closest
bank rather than comparing credit conditions obtained by different borrowers at varying
distance. We find that bank proximity improves loan conditions for MFI borrowers.
All things being equal, firms in the vicinity of a bank can secure larger loans with less
collateral from an MFI. The increase in loan amounts granted is significant in statistical
and economic terms. For instance, firms located in a circle of less than 500 meters to the
nearest bank obtain, on average, $200 more than firms located beyond two kilometers.
Results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. We draw special attention to improve
our identification by running alternative specifications (inclusion of municipality-period
dummies that capture all time-variant unobservable factors occurring at the municipality
level; focusing only on clients experienced a change in distance). In addition, we show
that effect of distance is stronger for well-established (older) and large firms in line with
our intuition.
This paper is directly related to a handful of articles that have scrutinized how the
development and expansion of the banking and MFI industries are interlinked. These
studies often employ cross-country investigation to relate how banking development af-
fects financial performance of MFIs with mixed results (Hermes et al., 2011; Ahlin et al.,
2011; Vanroose and D’Espallier, 2013). Recent works have focused on social perfor-
mance and outreach. Cull et al. (2014) document that the development of commercial
banks gives MFIs, especially commercially-oriented ones, incentives to explore new mar-
ket niches (e.g., smaller loans, lending targeted to women). Vanroose and D’Espallier
(2013) provide more conflicting conclusions. While MFIs offer small loans in countries
where the formal banking sector is more developed, MFIs reach less clients in these coun-
tries. Brown et al. (2016) have recently shed new light on the relationship between banks
4Due to the lack of data, we cannot use instrumental strategy to model bank’s decision to locate.
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and MFIs by adopting a micro-economic approach. They document that the openness of
an MFI branch increases the percentage of banked households in South-Eastern Europe.
We extend this literature in several ways. To our knowledge, we are the first to explic-
itly focus on competition between banks and MFIs. Vanroose and D’Espallier (2013) and
Cull et al. (2014) have provided indirect evidence on this topic. However, their results are
rather mixed and are subject to alternative interpretations. In particular, observing that
banking development favors outreach can be explained by the competition view (MFIs
focus on clients not targeted by banks) but also by a complementary effect because MFIs
benefit from banking development.5 Bank expansion may reduce management costs for
MFIs (Ahlin et al., 2011) and explain why MFIs are able to serve less aﬄuent clients (Cull
et al., 2014). Our analysis allows us to disentangle both effects because it is done at the
borrower-level (and complementary effect certainly occurs at the institution or branch
level that is controlled for). Our research can also be distinguished from Brown et al.
(2016), who point out that financial inclusion goes hand-in-hand with microfinance devel-
opment (deposit market); however the authors do not explore the presence of competition
in the credit market. In this way, our work differs from theirs as it focuses on a different
question in a different context (Madagascar instead of Eastern Europe). Our analysis also
complements the literature by scrutinizing the intensive margin effect, while the existing
literature focuses on the extensive margin effect. Competition induced by bank presence
could result in two effects. On the one hand, the competitive pressure induced by the
expansion of commercial banks could motivate MFIs to attract new clients, especially
those who are not wooed by banks (extensive margin). On the other hand, competi-
tion may induce MFIs to offer better loan conditions in order to retain clients (intensive
margin).6 Our work indicates that bank competition impacts not only the pools of MFI
clients (extensive margin) but also conditions faced by incumbent MFI clients (intensive
5It should be noted that even observing that commercial-oriented MFIs benefit more than others from
banking development (Cull et al., 2014) is not sufficient to prove the existence of competition between
banks and MFIs because commercially-oriented MFIs rely more on banking services than other MFIs.
6One exception is Cull et al. (2014) that consider how bank presence impact average interest rates.
Ideally, we would complement our study by an analysis of extensive margin. Unfortunately, a consistent
investigation would require that we have access to a survey of borrowers and non-borrowers as in Brown
et al. (2016). These data are not available in Madagascar rendering identification challenging. In a
companion investigation, we studied whether bank distance affects the characteristics of clients (age and
size) at the community level. However, our results are sensitive to specification and do not allow us to
draw definitive conclusions.
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margin). Nonetheless, these different contributions provide a similar general conclusion
by indicating that banks and microfinance institutions are influenced by development of
other intermediaries.
Our article also sheds light on the potential so-called ”mission drift” of some MFIs
caused by their upscaling strategies. Evidence of mission drift in the microfinance industry
as a whole is limited (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010) and previous works
cannot really determine if offering larger loans has resulted in crowding out the poorest
borrowers (Armenda´riz and Szafarz, 2011).7 Our results show that harsher competition
induced by bank proximity motivates MFIs to offer better loan conditions to less opaque
clients (i.e., the largest and oldest). Therefore, we could legitimately assume that MFIs
are targeting ”bankable” clients, contrary to their initial mission, and to the detriment
of other more opaque clients. However, focusing on wealthier clients may not necessarily
imply a ”mission drift” on the part of MFIs if this strategy allows MFIs to extract higher
rents in order to continue their initial mission (i.e., serving the poor). In the final section,
we provide some indirect statistics indicating that the upscaling strategy implemented
by our partner MFI may not lead to crowding out poor people. Specifically, we observe
that the new clients served by our partner MFI tend to be more opaque over time. Put
differently, our partner not only pursues its best clients but also continues to target small
firms.
Finally, our paper also provides marginal contributions to two additional bodies of
literature. First, we complement a scant body of literature investigating the determinants
of loan terms in microfinance. Some papers have addressed this issue in the context of
banking (Brick and Palia, 2007; Degryse et al., 2009). To our knowledge, only Behr et al.
(2011) have seriously investigated it in microfinance. They study the implications of the
lending relationship on collateral requirements and interest rates and document that the
lending relationship alleviates collateral requirements. We confirm this finding and also
show that the age of the firm has an unexpected impact: older firms tend to obtain
smaller loans at a higher cost (higher level of collateral requirements). This may reflect
the fact that older firms invest in riskier endeavors. Second, we also add slightly to a
7Average loan size used as a proxy of poverty outreach does not allow for distinction between inherent
microfinance characteristics (such as progressive lending and cross-subzidation) and mission drift.
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recent, but growing, body of literature on the role of distance in lending activities. Papers
have mainly focused on the effect of distance in banking (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 2002;
Degryse and Ongena, 2005), or even if rarely, in microfinance (Pedrosa and Do, 2011;
Presbitero and Rabellotti, 2014). In this paper, we show that distance can be employed
to test competition between different intermediaries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 exposes the conceptual
framework. Section 3 presents the data and variables and Section 4 the econometric
methodology. Section 5 and Section 6 display the econometric results and robustness
checks, respectively. Section 7 discusses the findings. The final section concludes.
2 Hypothesis tested
MFIs and banks in Madagascar have begun to offer comparable loans and are both con-
verging towards the financing of a new target group: small enterprises with high financing
needs. Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether commercial banks and MFIs, op-
erating theoretically on two different markets, compete or not. In doing so, we employ
data on credit contract terms granted by one of the largest MFI in Madagascar. We are
particularly interested to know if competition induced by bank presence influences loan
terms. A critical step consists in defining a good measure of competitive pressure induced
by banks on MFIs.8 We turn to the recent literature investigating the role of distance
in banking (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Banks may extract
rent from their relative proximity to the borrowing firms not only due to transportation
costs but also to informational advantages. For the lender, higher distance results in
higher monitoring costs (Sussman and Zeira, 1995) and more difficulty in assessing the
borrower’s trustworthiness (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). For the borrower, higher dis-
tance results in higher prospecting costs as it decreases their awareness of the availability
and conditions of the loans offered (especially in the absence of advertising as may be
the case, particularly in developing countries) and increases the cost of information (as
it takes more time to reach the nearest branch). Empirical investigations (Degryse and
8There are a large number of indices of competition in the banking literature. However, these measures
imply strong data requirements and are not well-adapted to consider competition between different types
of lenders (see Le´on, 2014).
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Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Bellucci et al., 2013) confirmed that credit
conditions deteriorate with bank-borrower proximity (even if credit access is improved).
In this paper, we focus on the role of distance between a MFI’s borrower and the
closest commercial bank. Banking literature also shows that borrowers located at the
proximity of a competing bank are more likely to get better credit conditions (Degryse
and Ongena, 2005; Bellucci et al., 2013). Indeed, switching costs are reduced by the
distance to the closest competitor due to reduction in transportation and informational
costs. In line with these arguments, we assume that sandwiching costs are increased with
distance between the borrower and the closest alternative lender (here, a commercial
bank). In other words, the probability of a MFI’s client being wooed by a commercial
bank increases with distance between her and the closest commercial bank.9
Assuming that borrowers located in the vicinity of a bank are more likely to get bank
loans, we study whether the distance between the borrower and the closest bank affects
loan conditions offered by our partner MFI. In absence of competition (banks and MFI
operate on two different markets), the MFI will be insensitive to the entry of a bank and
do not adapt its lending policy to this change. However, if MFIs and banks compete,
the MFI will react to the entry of a bank by improving its offers in order to retain its
current clients and avoid a flight to bank. We therefore make the two mutually exclusive
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1
Banks and MFIs compete if a MFI’s borrower located in the vicinity of a commercial bank
obtain better credit conditions; In other words, credit conditions are (positively) related
to the distance between the borrower and the closest commercial bank
Hypothesis 2
In absence of competition, the distance between a MFI’s borrower and the closest bank
does not affect loan conditions
9These statements are especially true considering that regular banks do not use wandering credit
officers to prospect clients in a large area but are rather directly solicited by customers. In addition, it
is worth noting that although mobile banking is currently developing in Madagascar, it does not enable
people to obtain credit and its reach remain small for the moment. Therefore, we do not believe that
mobile banking could influence our results.
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In the following, we present an empirical framework developed to disentangle between
both hypotheses.
3 Data and variables
3.1 Data
The unique dataset we analyze consists of all loans granted over the period from January
1, 2008 to December 31, 2014 by one of the largest MFIs in Madagascar.10 Our partner
shares with us its customer file. For each loan granted, we get data on the loan terms, as
well as information on the borrower’s business and the lender-borrower relationship. In
addition, we have data on the precise location (latitude and longitude) of a half of clients.
The initial database comprised about 74,599 loans made to 35,472 borrowers. How-
ever, before selecting the final data set used in the regressions, we applied some filters. We
first removed double-counting and observations for those loans where at least one variable
is lacking. We then trimmed the top and bottom 1% for each outcome and independent
variable to avoid the presence of outliers.11 Finally, we excluded observations with miss-
ing information on geographical location. By the end of 2014, our partner collected the
location of 46% of its clients.12 The final sample includes 14,834 borrowers representing
32,374 observations.
We complement our client database by identifying the location of every bank branch
operating in Madagascar. As of December 31, 2014, we identified 154 bank branches
operated by 12 commercial banks. We refer to the register of the Malagasy National
Bank13 to identify all of the commercial banks operating. We hand collect the postal
address of each branch on their website. Using addresses and Google-Maps c©, we obtain
the precise location of all branches (latitude and longitude). It is worth noting that only
half of the branches had a postal address accurate enough to be geolocated thanks only to
10MFIs in Madagascar are classified in three categories (1, 2, and 3). Category 3 is made up of the
largest MFIs in Madagascar, including our partner.
11Some exceptions are made for the age of the firm and the number of employees where the bottom
1% is zero and concerns a large number of observations (and is not an outlier).
12Since 2010 our partner has collected the precise location (latitude and longitude) of its clients. To
date, 16,636 clients out of 35,472 clients are geolocated when we consider the whole sample (46.9%).
13http://www.banque-centrale.mg/index.php?id=m8_5_1
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the internet. We complement our database with in situ visits to get the precise location
of unlocated branches. Finally, to obtain a time-varying measure, we complement data
on branch locations by collecting the list of active branches by year from 2008 to 2014.
To do so, we employ the annual list of branches provided by the Central Bank. We collect
the list of branches operating in 2008 and identify new branches in each subsequent year.
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Loan contracts
Data on credit loan terms are used to compute our outcome variables. Four different loan
conditions are provided by our partner MFI: loan amount, interest rate, maturity, and
collateral requirements. Loan amount and interest rates are deflated using the consumer
price index. For collateral requirements, we compute the ratio of collateral pledged to
total loans. Our partner provides us with the value of the collateral. The presence of
a bank may not only affect the quantity of collateral but also the quality of collateral.
We therefore also focus on the composition of collateral. Different forms of collateral are
required to obtain a loan. To simplify, we can distinguish between personal guarantees and
material guarantees. Personal guarantees involve a third-party who agrees to reimburse
the loan in case of default. Material guarantees (security) are all assets that the lender can
seize in the event of default. Because material guarantees directly affect them, borrowers
may prefer to limit amount of material assets that they guarantee for the total loan
amount. Better loan conditions therefore imply not only a limited ratio of collateral
to loan but also a limited percentage of material guarantee to collateral. We compute
this ratio as our second measure of collateral requirements. The descriptive statistics,
reported in Table 1, document that loan amount represents $1,129 USD on average. The
real interest rate is 12.6% and the average loan has a maturity of one year. Guaranteed
collateral represents 2.8 times the total value of the loans.
Our partner gives us information on four loan contract characteristics: loan amount,
collateral requirements, interest rate, and maturity.14 However, in the empirical analysis,
14There may be other ways for the MFI to compete, such as with the quality of its services, commercial
advice dispensed by credit officers, application costs and time etc. Unfortunately, our database does not
allow us to consider these aspects.
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we focus exclusively on loan amount and collateral requirements. We do not exploit data
on interest rates and maturity due to a lack of variation. Indeed, the majority of the
loans have a maturity of one year (90% of the loans have a maturity between 365 days
and 395 days), and interest rates vary between two values in nominal terms (18% or
21%).15 Loan amount and collateral requirements capture two different aspects. Loan
amount may proxy availability of credit in a context where borrowers cannot access to
complete funds required. Collateral requirements is more related to price in a context of
fixed interest rates (Fisman et al., 2017).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CV†
Loan contract
Amount‡ 32,373 1,129 2,207 22.9 40,076 1.95
Interest rate 32,373 0.126 0.027 0.060 0.220 0.21
Maturity 32,373 389.0 49.2 88 1,095 0.13
Collateral/Amount 32,373 2.851 1.272 0.088 10.84 0.45
Securities/Collateral 32,373 0.545 0.162 0 1 0.30
Individual characteristics
Sales‡ 32,373 1762.6 2792 0.4 24,555 1.58
Employees 32,373 2.257 2.498 0 32 1.11
Age (firm) 32,373 8.608 6.371 0 44 0.74
Borrower-lender relationship
Number 32,373 2.901 2.487 1 20 0.86
Year 32,373 2.254 3.043 0 19 1.35
Distance
- in meters 32,373 2,403 5,529 5.53 88,604 2.30
- in log 32,373 7.027 1.122 1.710 11.39 0.16
- Dummy 32,373 0.156 0.361 0 1 2.31
- Dist<500m 32,373 0.202 0.401 0 1 2.31
- 500m<dist<1000m 32,373 0.258 0.438 0 1 1.70
- 1000m<dist<1500m 32,373 0.173 0.378 0 1 2.19
- 1500m<dist<2000m 32,373 0.103 0.304 0 1 2.19
- dist>2000m 32,373 0.264 0.441 0 1 1.67
† CV=Std. Dev/Mean; ‡ Data are deflated and in USD
3.2.2 Distance
A crucial step consists in building a measure of competition intensity. As expressed
above, we employ the distance between a borrower and the closest bank (as the crow
flies). The intuition is based on the idea that a client in the vicinity of a bank is more
likely to be captured by a bank than is a remote client due to transportation costs and
information asymmetry. To compute our interest variable, namely the distance between a
given borrower and the closest bank, we used the precise location of borrowers provided by
15In a previous version, we run models explaining (real) interest rates and maturity. Inclusion of
period-dummies capture all variability in interest rates due to deflation. Model explaining maturity fail
to provide consistent results for both interest and control variables.
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our partner MFI and the location of banks that we had hand-collected. Using QGIS c©, an
open source geographic information system, we computed the euclidian distance between
a given borrower and the closest bank.
Our measure differs from the literature (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and
Hauswald, 2010) in two aspects. First, for the sake of simplicity and accuracy, we as-
sessed the shortest distance in kilometers and did not use the shortest traveling time.16
Second, we compute a time-variant measure of distance. It is common in the literature
on developed countries to use time-invariant distance because bank networks do not sig-
nificantly change over time. However, the network of bank branches in Madagascar has
dramatically expanded from 2008 to 2014 in Madagascar. More than 40% of branches in
2014 were not active in 2008 (63 to 154). As a result, using distance in 2014 to proxy
distance in 2008 can be misleading. We therefore compute the distance from the borrower
(whose location is time-invariant) and the closest bank (which can change over if a new
bank opens in the vicinity) for each year. Obtaining a time-variant distance variable
has the additional advantage of allowing us to provide better identification as explained
below.
In addition to linear distance, we employ alternative measures of distance. In spite of
the advantage of transparency, the linear measure is perhaps not the most fitted. A same
reduction of distance (e.g. 500 meters) does not have the same implication for a client
located at one kilometer to the closest bank and for a client located at five kilometers.
We may expect that the effect is stronger for the former and almost not existent for
the latter. To consider this point, we run regressions by using alternative measures of
distance. First, we employ the logarithm of distance. In addition, we consider categorical
dummies. The first dummy takes value 1 if a borrower is located at less than 500 meters
of the closest bank branch, and 0 otherwise. The second dummy takes value 1 if the
distance between the client and the closest bank branch is between 500 meters and one
kilometer, and so on until 2000 meters. We omit dummy for distance above 2000 meters.
Finally, for each client we create a treatment dummy equals to one in period t if distance
observed in t is lower than that observed in the initial period.17 This dummy captures
16Due to the lack of information on the road network in Madagascar, computing the shortest distance
for each borrower would have been very difficult and inaccurate.
17For instance, let us assume that the entry of a new bank in 2011 reduces the distance between client
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how loan dynamic is shaped by a reduction in distance.
3.2.3 Control variables
The list of control variables includes information on business characteristics and on
borrower-lender relationship intensity. The literature shows that business characteris-
tics are important determinants of loan contract terms in banking (Degryse et al., 2009)
and in microfinance (Behr et al., 2011). In particular, opaque firms obtain less advanta-
geous credit conditions. Opacity is often assessed by the size (Berger et al., 2001) and
age of the firm (Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008). We therefore add two measures of size
(total sales and number of employees) and the age of the firm. In addition, we control
for business activity by using dummies for the business sector.
In addition, the banking literature underlines the importance of controlling for the
lending relationship (Degryse et al., 2009). This aspect is particularly important in this
work for two reasons. First, our identification strategy (see below) implies that we con-
trol for lending relationship. Second, microfinance lending technologies are based on
dynamic incentives (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2010). We therefore expect loan amount
to increase with the length of the lending relationship. Regarding collateral, Behr et al.
(2011) document that collateral requirements are relaxed over the course of the lending
relationship. Following Behr et al. (2011), we proxy the lending relationship using the
number of loans obtained by the borrowers.18. As shown in Table 1, the average firm
financed by our partner is eight years old and has two employees and total monthly sales
of approximately $1,762 USD. On average, borrowers have had a relationship with our
partner MFI for two years.
A and her closest bank. The dummy will take value 0 from 2008 to 2011 and then the value of 1. If
this client did not experienced a reduction of distance, the dummy value is zero from 2008 to 2014. We
expect an opposite sign that those observed for distance and log of distance.
18An alternative measure is the duration of the relationship (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and
Udell, 1995) in years, which we utilize without altering our conclusions. The two measures of the lender-
borrower relationship are closely related with a correlation coefficient exceeding 0.9
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4 Empirical strategy
We study whether the presence of a bank affects credit conditions faced by borrowers of
our partner MFI. We follow the literature (Degryse et al., 2009; Behr et al., 2011) and
employ a linear specification as follows:
yit = βdit + ∆Xit + µi + νt + ηs + τj + it (1)
where yit is the dependent variable (total amount or collateral requirements) for borrower
i in period t; dit is the distance between the borrower i and the closest bank in period t;
Xit is a matrix of variables controlling for firm’s characteristics and lending relationship;
µi, νt, and ηs are borrower i, period t, and sector s fixed effects, respectively. Finally,
supply-side factors are considered through the inclusion of credit officer dummies that
correct for all unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the lender (τj).
We further employ one extension of Eq. 1 by adding other characteristics of loan
terms as control variables as follows:
yit = βdit + ∆Xit + γy˜it + µi + νt + ηs + τj + it (2)
Specifically, y˜it includes interest rates, maturity and collateral ratio when we consider
the determinants of loan amount; and, interest rates, maturity and loan amount when
we consider the determinants of collateral ratio. The rational for this inclusion is that
loan terms are jointly determined (Brick and Palia, 2007). However, including other loan
terms might induce an endogeneity problem due to reverse causation and unobserved
third factors. As a result, our baseline model is run without other loan terms and their
inclusion is viewed as a robustness check.
As explained above, we consider only two dependent variables (amount and collateral
requirements) due to the lack of variability of interest rate and maturity. We expect that
firms close to banks obtain larger loan amount in line with Hypothesis 1 (β < 0 when
we consider linear or log of distance and β > 0 when we consider treatment dummy
and categorical classes). Competition could also influence the collateral pledged by the
borrower. Contrary to a common belief, physical collateral is used in individual lending
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in microfinance (Behr et al., 2011). Collateral is used by MFIs to handle information
asymmetry, either as a screening device or as an incentive for the borrower to behave
properly. We believe that lenders may choose to lower the collateral-to-loan ratio in
order to retain current borrowers or attract new ones, because this allows clients either to
obtain a larger loan or to decrease the consequences in case of default. As a consequence,
Hypothesis 1 is validated if distance affects collateral requirements. In other words, we
expect that β > 0 when we consider linear or log of distance and β < 0 when we consider
treatment dummy and categories of distance. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed if coefficients
associated with distance are not statistically significant in different specifications (using
size of the loan or collateral requirements).
A challenge is to go beyond a simple correlation and provide causal interpretation. One
might raise concerns about the fact that credit conditions as well as location (distance)
can be affected by unobserved characteristics. For instance, a dynamic entrepreneur may
be able to obtain favorable credit conditions and be more likely to be located in a dynamic
area (close to bank). As a result, the coefficient associated with distance will only reflect
the relationship between unobserved individual characteristics and loan contract terms.
We cannot employ instrumental variable strategy (or a natural experiment) due to the
lack of data. A relevant instrument should model bank’s decision to locate. In doing so,
we must employ time-varying variables at sub-regional level.19 However, such information
is not available in Madagascar.
To tackle the identification issue, we include individual fixed effects. Adding fixed ef-
fects allows us to focus on within variation and to avoid all bias induced by time-invariant
unobserved characteristics that affect location and credit terms. In other words, we inves-
tigate whether the credit condition dynamic is shaped by a change in distance between
the borrower and the closest bank rather than comparing credit conditions obtained by
different borrowers at different distance. It should be noted that it is crucial to control
for the intensity of the lender-borrower relationship. If not included, we fail to distinguish
between the impact of distance and the effect of lending relationship that plays a central
19Madagascar is divided into four main subdivisions: Regions or ”faritany” (22), counties or ”fivondro-
nana”(114), municipalities or ”kaominina” (1,395) and district or ”fokontany”(17,544). To be precise, the
national statistical institute (INSTAT) provides data on municipalities and district for one year (2009)
over our period of reference.
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role in microfinance lending technologies.20
The inclusion of borrower fixed effects has an additional advantage. If MFI’s branches
are located in the vicinity of bank branches, distance between a bank and a client merely
reflects the distance between the lender (here the credit officer) and the borrower. Recent
papers have shown that distance between the borrower and the lender affects information
asymmetry in microfinance (Pedrosa and Do, 2011; Presbitero and Rabellotti, 2014)21,
and therefore credit conditions (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Adding individual dummies
allows us to control for this aspect because the distance between borrowers and their
credit office is time-invariant in our study.22
5 Baseline result
We test whether MFIs and banks compete by scrutinizing if our partner MFI is sensitive
to the entry of a new bank at the proximity of its clients. We consider two different
loan characteristics: loan amount and collateral requirements. As explained in Section 3,
we cannot employ interest rate and maturity due to a lack of variability. Hypothesis 1
(existence of competition) will be confirmed if borrowers in the vicinity of a bank should
obtain larger loans and pledge less collateral. At the opposite, in absence of competition,
loan contract terms offered by MFIs should not be affected by bank presence (Hypothesis
2).
5.1 Loan amount
We first report results regarding the effect of distance on the size of loan in Table 2.
The hypothesis of competition between MFIs and banks is validated if the coefficients
associated with continuous measures of distance are negative (columns [1-4]) and positive
for discrete measures of distance (columns [5-8]).
In all specifications, coefficients associated with distance have the expected sign and
20Our econometric findings are robust to the exclusion of lending relationship variable.
21Pedrosa and Do (2011) show that the intensity of screening increases with distance and Presbitero
and Rabellotti (2014) show that distance increases information asymmetry and moral hazard.
22Even if clients sometimes change of credit officers, it is worth noting that the distance between MFI
clients and their credit offices is time-invariant because clients change for a credit officer in the same
office.
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Table 2: Determinants of loan amount
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.053*** -0.051***
(-3.29) (-3.43)
log(distance) -0.045* -0.038*
(-1.91) (-1.85)
Dummy 78.73** 62.36**
(2.45) (2.17)
Dist<500m 277.96** 220.27*
(1.97) (1.73)
500m<d<1000m 187.15* 110.03
(1.81) (1.18)
1000m<d<1500m -42.76 -51.32
(-0.48) (-0.63)
1500m<d<2000m -21.04 -12.93
(-0.33) (-0.23)
Sales 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.091*** 0.104*** 0.091*** 0.104***
(5.48) (6.91) (5.48) (6.91) (5.48) (6.91) (5.48) (6.91)
Employees 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.057***
(3.13) (3.92) (3.12) (3.92) (3.11) (3.91) (3.10) (3.90)
Firm age -0.429*** -0.401*** -0.438*** -0.407*** -0.445*** -0.411*** -0.437*** -0.404***
(-3.39) (-3.58) (-3.45) (-3.60) (-3.53) (-3.68) (-3.42) (-3.56)
Loan number 0.369*** 0.294*** 0.0370*** 0.295*** 0.370*** 0.295*** 0.370*** 0.295***
(11.99) (10.26) (12.01) (10.29) (12.03) (10.30) (12.05) (10.30)
Interest rate -0.182* -0.183* -0.182* -0.182*
(-1.92) (-1.92) (-1.92) (-1.91)
Maturity 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.257***
(13.54) (13.55) (13.54) (13.56)
Collateral/Loan -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031***
(-4.41) (-4.38) (-4.38) (-4.34)
Observations 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.079 0.270 0.079 0.270 0.079 0.270 0.079 0.270
The dependent variable is the total loan amount (in deflated USD). The table shows estimations with four different
measures of distance (for categories distance, the omitted category is distance above 2,000 meters). Within estimator
is used and period, industry and credit officer dummies are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered
at the borrower level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous
variables (distance, log and control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories). *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
are statistically significant at the usual thresholds, in line with Hypothesis 1. Distance is
not only statistical significant but also economically significant: an one standard deviation
increase in distance induces a reduction of the loan amount by more than $110 (mean
of loan amount equals $1,129).23 Using alternative measure of distance provides similar
findings. All things being equal, the fact to experience a decrease in distance raises the
loan amount by more than $60 in the most conservative regression (column [6]). Results
reported in columns [7-8] provide evidence that the effect of distance is not homogenous.
They indicate that only clients located in a circle of less than 500 meters of a bank obtain
larger loans. The observed impact is far from anecdotal: the fact to be located in a circle
23Table 2 reports standardized coefficients. The standardized coefficients are interpreted as the stan-
dard deviation change in the dependent variable when the independent variable is changed by one stan-
dard deviation (Bring, 1994). Put differently, the impact of one standard deviation of variable X is
computed as: σy ∗ βˆx where σy is the standard deviation of Y and βˆx the estimated standardized coeffi-
cient of X. Here the impact of distance is obtained as σy ∗ βˆd = 2207 ∗ 0.051 = 112
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of less than 500 meters increases the loan amount by more than $200 (comparatively to
a previous situation with a distance above 2000 meters, the omitted category).
The statistical effect of distance is robust to the inclusion of other credit conditions
but its economic effect is reduced by around one fifth in different specifications. This
may reflect the fact that distance alter other terms of loan contracts (as shown below).
We also note that the interest rate tends to be weakly correlated with the size of the
loan, contrary to maturity (positive correlation) and collateral requirements (negative
correlation). Regarding control variables, we note that larger firms get access to larger
loans, while older firms do not. In addition, borrowers benefit from longer and more
intense relationships with the lender through larger loans. Dynamic incentives are used in
microfinance to reduce moral hazard (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2010) and it is therefore
normal to observe a positive correlation between the number of loans and the loan amount.
5.2 Collateral requirements
We then study the determinants of collateral requirements by considering the ratio of
collateral value to total loan value. Results are displayed in Table 3. According to
Hypothesis 1, we expect that the ratio of collateral to loan is lower for firms in the
vicinity of a bank. Put differently, we expect that β > 0 for continuous measures of
distance (columns [1-4]) and β < 0 for discrete measures of distance (columns [5-8]).
Coefficients associated with linear measure of distance (columns [1-2]) are positive as
expected but not statistically significant. However, coefficients are significant at the 1%
level when we consider the natural logarithm of distance (columns [3-4]). This finding
is confirmed when we focus on alternative measures of distance: borrowers located in
the vicinity of a bank pledge less collateral. Coefficients are statistically significant and
have the expected negative sign in models with treatment dummy (columns [5-6]) and
distance categories (columns [7-8]). These results tend to confirm Hypothesis 1 and reject
Hypothesis 2.
Economic impact of distance on collateral seems worthy of attention, albeit not huge.
A one standard deviation increase in (log of) distance induces an increase of the collateral-
to-loan ratio by almost 15%. Amplitude given by discrete measures are rather similar.
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Table 3: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.046 0.046
(0.67) (067)
log(distance) 0.105*** 0.100***
(2.74) (2.62)
Dummy -0.126*** -0.121***
(-4.00) (-3.84)
Dist<500m -0.386*** -0.368***
(-3.53) (-3.36)
500m<dist<1000m -0.268*** -0.255***
(-2.80) (-2.67)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.116 -0.119
(-1.29) (-1.34)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.050 -0.052
(-0.60) (-0.62)
Sales 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.011
(0.10) (0.89) (0.11) (0.89) (0.11) (0.89) (0.13) (0.90)
Employees -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.002
(-0.29) (0.09) (-0.28) (0.10) (-0.24) (0.14) (-0.26) (0.11)
Firm age 0.436** 0.375* 0.471** 0.410* 0.499** 0.436** 0.477** 0.416**
(2.04) (1.75) (2.21) (1.92) (2.33) (2.03) (2.25) (1.95)
Loan number -0.485*** -0.443*** 0.486*** -0.443*** -0.488*** -0.446*** -0.487*** -0.445***
(9.56) (-8.60) (-9.56) (-8.61) (-9.63) (-8.67) (-9.59) (-8.63)
Interest rate 0.101 0.103 0.102 0.102
(1.53) (1.56) (1.54) (1.54)
Maturity -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(-0.62) (-0.61) (-0.62) (-0.61)
Amount -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.110***
(-4.65) (-4.62) (-4.62) (-4.57)
Observations 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.030 0.035 0.030 0.035 0.030 0.035 0.030 0.035
The dependent variable is the ratio of collateral to loan value. The table shows estimations with four different measures
of distance (for categories distance, the omitted category is distance above 2,000 meters). Within estimator is used
and period, industry and credit officer dummies are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the
borrower level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous variables
(distance, log and control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories). *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
The fact to experience a reduction in distance reduces this ratio by 12% (columns [5-6]).
Results from columns [7-8] indicate that clients located in a circle of 500 meters of a bank
have a collateral ratio that is reduced by 40 points (comparatively to those located at
2000 meters and more) and by more than 25 points for those with a distance between 500
meters and one kilometer. These differences are far from anecdotal insofar as the average
value of collateral ratio equals 280%.
Regarding control variables, our model provides interesting results. First, we point
out that collateral requirements and loan amount are negatively correlated. In addition,
we show that coefficients associated with the number of loans granted by our partner
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding indicates that the
lending relationship relaxes collateral requirements, confirming findings obtained by Behr
et al. (2011) in Mozambique.
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The presence of a bank may not only affect the quantity of collateral, but also the
”quality” of collateral. We therefore use an alternative measure of collateral using the
composition of collateral. We employ the ratio of material guarantees to total guarantees.
Material guarantees are more costly for borrowers than personal guarantees (i.e., third-
party). According to our hypothesis, we expect that the ratio of costlier (material)
guarantees is positively related with distance, indicating that firms close to banks obtain
better credit conditions.
Table 4: Determinants of the composition of collateral
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.031 -0.037
(-0.68) (-0.82)
log(distance) 0.005 0.0045
(1.12) (0.97)
Dummy -0.0149*** -0.0142***
(3.71) (3.56)
Dist<500m -0.0276** -0.0252**
(-2.13) (-1.96)
500m<dist<1000m -0.0296*** -0.0280**
(-2.69) (-2.56)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.0097 -0.0101
(0.96) (-1.01)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.0051 -0.0053
(-0.56) (-0.58)
Sales -0.046*** -0.036*** -0.046*** -0.036*** -0.046*** -0.036*** 0.002 0.011
(-3.40) (-2.62) (-3.40) (-2.62) (-3.40) (-2.62) (0.13) (0.90)
Employees 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.012 -0.004 0.002
(0.47) (0.96) (0.47) (0.96) (0.47) (0.96) (-0.26) (0.11)
Firm age 0.407* 0.352* 0.407* 0.352* 0.407* 0.352* 0.477** 0.416**
(1.91) (1.66) (1.91) (1.66) (1.91) (1.66) (2.25) (1.95)
Loan number -0.769*** -0.725*** -0.769*** -0.725*** -0.769*** -0.725*** -0.487*** -0.445***
(-16.93) (-16.00) (-16.93) (-16.00) (-16.93) (-16.00) (-9.59) (-8.63)
Interest rate -0.119*** -0.119*** -0.119*** 0.102
(-6.50) (-6.50) (-6.50) (1.54)
Maturity 0.028 0.028 0.028 -0.008
(0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (-0.61)
Amount 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.110***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (-4.57)
Observations 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.070 0.075 0.071 0.076 0.071 0.076 0.071 0.075
The dependent variable is the ratio of collateral to loan value. The table shows estimations with four different measures of
distance (for categories distance, the omitted category is distance above 2,000 meters). Within estimator is used and period,
industry and credit officer dummies are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous variables (distance, log and
control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories). *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
Econometric results using the composition of collateral are reported in Table 4. Find-
ings are very similar to those obtained using the amount of collateral and can be summa-
rized as follows. Distance is not related to the level of material collateral in all specifica-
tions considering continuous measures. However, findings are in line with Hypothesis 1
when we employ discrete variables (dummy and categories). As previously for collateral
ratio, we show that coefficients associate to dummy for treated and for two first categories
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are statistically significant. In economic terms, however, the impact of distance is rather
limited. For instance, the fact to experience a decrease in distance reduces the ratio of
material guarantees by 1.5 percentage points (mean equals 54.5% and standard deviation
equals 16.2%).
6 Robustness checks
In the baseline model, we present results with different measures of distance and dif-
ferent specifications (without/with other contract terms). In the following, we provide
additional robustness checks to be ascertain that our findings are robust to alternative
specification.24
6.1 Identification issue
A critical issue relies on identification insofar as borrower’s and bank’s locations are not
random. Unfortunately, as explained abvoe, we cannot use an instrumental strategy
due to lack of data available to model bank’s branch location decision. Nonetheless, to
reinforce our identification strategy we present additional tests.
6.1.1 Controlling for time-invariant unobserved factors
We firstly add municipality-semester dummies. Our identification strategy is based on the
inclusion of borrower fixed effects that allows us to control for all time-invariant unobserv-
able characteristics. However, one might raise concerns about time-variant unobserved
factors affecting both bank branch location, firms’ performance and credit conditions. In
particular, since 2009 Madagascar has been particularly embroiled in political and eco-
nomic turmoil. This crisis may force some SMEs, that usually resort to banks, to turn
24We do not include the determinants of the type of collateral because (i) results of robustness checks
are in line with specifications explaining the collateral ratio; (ii) the economic impact of distance is
somewhat limited for this variable. In addition, we also run additional robustness checks, unreported for
sake of brevity (but available upon request): (i) we change the sample by excluding borrowers located in
Tananarive; (ii) we run models without credit officer dummies; (iii) we run the model without lending
relationship variable insofar as this variable can be endogeneous; and, (iv) we modify method adopted
to correct standard errors by running models without correction, with standard errors clustered at the
credit officer level, at the municipality-period level, and at the industry-period level. In all cases, our
conclusions remain valid.
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Table 5: Inclusion of municipality-semester dummies
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.120** -0.190**
(-2.08) (-2.30)
Log(distance) -0.032 -0.035
(-1.12) (-1.46)
Dummy 97.58** 88.69**
(2.28) (2.25)
dist<500m 331.23** 270.00*
(2.01) (1.94)
500m<dist<1000m 229.05* 173.70
(1.70) (1.37)
1000m<dist<1500m 20.21 32.71
(0.19) (0.34)
1500m<dist<2000m 32.99 41.69
(0.44) (0.61)
Obs. 32,374 32,375 32,376 32,377 32,378 32,379 32,380 32,381
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,835 14,836 14,837 14,838 14,839 14,840 14,841
R2 (within) 0.170 0.338 0.170 0.338 0.170 0.338 0.170 0.338
Panel B: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.112 0.106
(0.46) (0.43)
Log(distance) 0.086* 0.083†
(1.66) (1.61)
Dummy -0.052 -0.049
(-1.29) (-1.15)
dist<500m -0.317** -0.294*
(-2.11) (-1.95)
500m<dist<1000m -0.220* -0.203*
(-1.67) (-1.64)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.121 -0.120
(-1.08) (-1.07)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.073 -0.071
(-0.78) (-0.75)
Obs. 32,374 32,375 32,376 32,377 32,378 32,379 32,380 32,381
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,835 14,836 14,837 14,838 14,839 14,840 14,841
R2 (within) 0.111 0.116 0.111 0.117 0.111 0.116 0.112 0.117
The dependent variables are the total amount of loan (Panel A) and the collateral-to-loan ratio (Panel B).
Within estimator is used. The list of control variables includes total sales (in constant US$), the number of
employees, the firm age, the number of loan between the firm and our partner IMF). In columns [2], [4], [6]
and [8], we also add other contract terms. In all specifications, we include town-semester dummies, credit
officer dummies and industry-dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level and t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous variables (distance, log
and control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories). †, *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
to MFI in order to meet unexpected expenses or compensate sales decreasing. If bank
clients are mainly located next to bank branches, then new clients turning to MFIs may
enjoy better loan conditions from MFI because they are certainly less ”opaque”. In these
robustness checks, we therefore add municipality-semester dummies.25 These dummies
enable us to control for any shock that occurs at the municipality level over time, such
as the economic crisis that started in 2009 and that may have a different impact depend-
25Considering fokontany is impossible due to the large number of fokontanies (17,544). In addition,
fokontanies differ greatly in terms of size and number of population (and clients); in some of them, we
have only one client. Using instrumental variable approach is impossible in our study due to the limited
data available.
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ing on the municipality.26 This approach has an additional advantage by controlling for
any local shocks, beyond economic deterioration. In particular, as explained above, a
change in the number of competitors (MFIs or banks) could affect credit conditions as
documented in spatial models (see Degryse and Ongena, 2005). By adding municipality-
semester dummies, we also control for this possible bias. We believe that this approach
allows us to control for a large range of time-invariant unobserved factors and therefore
provide unbiased estimations. A limitation with this approach (explaining why we do
not employ it in our baseline) is the number of parameters to estimate (more than 2,000
parameters). Results on models including municipality-semester dummies are displayed
in Table 5. Coefficients associated with distance, at the exception of log of distance, have
the expected sign and are statistically significant when we study the determinants of loan
amount (Panel A). In Panel B, we investigate the determinants of collateral ratio. As
in the baseline model, coefficients associated with distance have the expected sign but
are not always statistically significant at the usual threshold, especially when we consider
continuous measures. In a nutshell, after controlling for time-variant unobserved factors,
our findings remain largely robust (and are even reinforced for loan amount).
6.1.2 Focusing on borrowers that experienced a reduction in distance
Our econometric intuition is based on the idea that borrowers experienced a reduction
in distance will obtain favourable loan conditions. In the baseline model, we consider
borrowers who experienced a reduction in distance and those who do not. To our point
of view, it is better to consider both groups of borrowers. In the spirit of impact evalua-
tion model, borrowers without change in distance can be considered as control group and
other borrowers as treatment group (this analogy is particularly suited when we consider
the treated dummy). Nonetheless, our findings should be robust if we consider only the
group of treated. We therefore rerun our baseline models by excluding borrowers that
did not experience a decrease in distance. Results reported in Table 6 confirm our main
findings, in spite of a sharp decrease in the number of observations.
26We also consider an alternative way to control for this issue. We keep only old borrowers defined as
firms that have been clients to our partner since 2010. As shown in the Appendix (Table A1), the main
impact is unchanged, and even reinforced.
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Table 6: Keeping only borrowers that experienced a change in distance
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.044*** -0.043***
(-3.28) (-3.43)
log(distance) -0.037* -0.032*
(-1.83) (-1.86)
Dummy 98.53*** 83.70***
(2.73) (2.58)
500m<d<1000m 290.88* 240.61*
(1.91) (1.74)
1000m<d<1500m 202.34* 126.05
(1.91) (1.30)
1500m<d<2000m -34.43 -35.40
(-0.36) (-0.40)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154
Nb. Borrowers 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187
R2 (within) 0.0890 0.288 0.0888 0.287 0.0887 0.287 0.0905 0.288
Panel B: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.036 0.031
(0.56) (0.49)
log(distance) 0.078** 0.074**
(2.17) (2.07)
Dummy -0.146*** -0.140***
(-4.02) (-3.88)
500m<d<1000m -0.340*** -0.324***
(-2.95) (-2.80)
1000m<d<1500m -0.242** -0.231**
(-2.46) (-2.05)
1500m<d<2000m -0.099 -0.102
(-1.09) (-0.58)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154 9154
Nb. Borrowers 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187 2187
R2 (within) 0.0306 0.0353 0.0317 0.0363 0.0324 0.0370 0.0327 0.0371
The dependent variables are the total amount of loan (Panel A) and the collateral-to-loan ratio (Panel B).
Within estimator is used. The list of control variables includes total sales (in constant US$), the number of
employees, the firm age, the number of loan between the firm and our partner IMF). In columns [2], [4], [6] and
[8], we also add other contract terms. In all specifications, we include semester dummies, credit officer dummies
and industry-dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level and t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous variables (distance, log and control variables)
and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories). †, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
15%, 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
6.1.3 Transparent vs. opaque borrowers
Finally we test to assess whether our story based on competition between banks and
MFIs is validated. We argue that transparent firms are more likely to be captured by
formal banks than opaque firms. To test this intuition we run the econometric model on
two sub-samples of opaque and transparent firms. To distinguish between groups, we use
two usual proxies of transparency, namely the size of the firm (Berger et al., 2001) and
the age of the firm (Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2008). A firm is classified as an opaque
one if its size (assessed by total sales or the number of employees) or its age is below the
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median. We then regress Equation 1 on different sub-samples.27 We expect the impact
of distance is amplified for older and larger firms. Table 7 displays results regarding loan
amount determinants on different sub-samples of old/young firms and large/small firms.
Samples are divided according to the median age (Panel A), total sales (Panel B), and
the number of employees (Panel C). The first four columns present estimations for the
sub-sample of opaque firms (value of age, sales and employees below the median) and the
last four columns present those for transparent firms. In a word, while results are not
always statistically significant, the economic impact of distance is stronger for transparent
firms. In details, we show in Panel A that older firms benefit more from a bank in the
vicinity than younger firms. Coefficients associated with continuous measures of distance
and treatment dummy are only statistically significant for old firms. Results using firm
size to distinguish between opaque and transparent firms are less clear-cut in statistical
terms (Panels B and C). Nonetheless, the impact of distance in terms of amplitude is
stronger for larger firms. In particular when we consider treatment dummy or categories
of distance, we show that large firms benefit more from a proximity with a bank. We
extend our analysis by scrutinizing the impact of distance on the ratio of collateral to
total loan for both groups of firms. Results by sub-groups of firms, displayed in Table
8, are more clear-cut than those obtained for loan amount and give some support to
our intuition: transparent firms benefit more from a proximity of a bank. Coefficients
associated with distance variables are often statistically significant only for the group of
old or large firms. In addition, the economic impact of distance is stronger for the most
transparent firms.
27Considering quartile instead of median does not alter our findings.
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Table 7: Determinants of loan amount, sub-sample analysis
Panel A: Age of the firm
Young firms (age<Median) Old firms (age>Median)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.025 -0.044**
(-0.93) (-3.04)
Log(distance) -0.037 -0.040†
(-1.11) (-1.49)
Dummy 3.67 116.55**
(0.12) (2.32)
dist<500m 195.43 266.15
(1.11) (1.26)
500m<dist<1000m 51.42 159.22
(0.40) (0.98)
1000m<dist<1500m -68.73 -129.01
(-0.57) (-0.91)
1500m<dist<2000m -4.47 -8.45
(-0.09) (-0.09)
Control
- Borrowers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Loan contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
- Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Credit officer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 16,824 16,824 16,824 16,824 15,543 15,543 15,543 15,543
Nb. Borrowers 9,422 9,422 9,422 9,422 6,809 6,809 6,809 6,809
R2 (within) 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.324 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.266
Panel B: Total sales
Small firms (Sales<Median) Large firms (Sales>Median)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.015 -0.043***
(-0.91) (-2.99)
Log(distance) 0.011 -0.034†
(0.45) (-1.59)
Dummy 44.35** 71.00
(2.22) (1.41)
dist<500m -20.03 312.15†
(-0.38) (1.49)
500m<dist<1000m 28.78 192.78
(0.68) (1.26)
1000m<dist<1500m 26.22 -171.26
(0.61) (-1.25)
1500m<dist<2000m 44.12 -57.84
(1.17) (-0.62)
Control
- Borrowers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Loan contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
- Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Credit officer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 16,192 16,192 16,192 16,192 16,175 16,175 16,175 16,175
Nb. Borrowers 9,770 9,770 9,770 9,770 7,283 7,283 7,283 7,283
R2 (within) 0.231 0.231 0.231 0.231 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.311
Panel C: Number of employees
Small firms (Nb. Empl.<Median) Large firms (Nb. Empl.>Median)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.055** -0.050***
(-2.14) (-2.66)
Log(distance) -0.024 -0.054
(-1.17) (-1.42)
Dummy 28.42* 150.20†
(1.65) (1.58)
dist<500m 68.99 633.17†
(0.87) (1.59)
500m<dist<1000m 28.03 51.62
(1.46) (0.20)
1000m<dist<1500m 42.02 -173.52
(0.61) (-0.72)
1500m<dist<2000m -10.26 48.07
(-0.21) (0.31)
Control
- Borrowers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Loan contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
- Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Credit officer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 23,477 23,477 23,477 23,477 8,890 8,890 8,890 8,890
Nb. Borrowers 12,488 12,488 12,488 12,488 4,623 4,623 4,623 4,623
R2 (within) 0.247 0.246 0.246 0.247 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.319
The dependent variables is total amount of loan. The sample is divided according to the age of the firm (panel
A), total sales (panel B) and the number of employees (panel C). Within estimator is used and period- and
industry-dummies as well as control variables (sales, number of employees, and firm age) are included in all
specifications. Other loan terms (maturity, rate and collateral ratio) are included as controls in columns [3],
[4], [7] and [8]. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Standardized coefficients are reported. †, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 15%, 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
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Table 8: Determinants of collateral ratio, sub-sample analysis
Panel A: Age of the firm
Young firms (age<Median) Old firms (age>Median)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.191** 0.059
(-2.16) (0.75)
Log(distance) -0.043 0.181***
(-0.67) (3.49)
Dummy -0.064 -0.129**
(-1.40) (-2.70)
dist<500m -0.032 -0.648***
(-0.18) (-4.03)
500m<dist<1000m -0.059 -0.407***
(-0.39) (-2.84)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.114 -0.241*
(-0.82) (-1.81)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.172 -0.057
(-1.30) (-0.46)
Control
- Borrowers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Loan contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
- Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Credit officer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 16,824 16,824 16,824 16,824 15,543 15,543 15,543 15,543
Nb. Borrowers 9,422 9,422 9,422 9,422 6,809 6,809 6,809 6,809
R2 (within) 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.067 0.031 0.033 0.031 0.034
Panel B: Total sales
Small firms (Sales<Median) Large firms (Sales>Median)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.027 0.058
(0.29) (0.64)
Log(distance) 0.105 0.104**
(1.30) (2.06)
Dummy -0.092* -0.122***
(-1.73) (-2.84)
dist<500m -0.462*** -0.380**
(-2.63) (-2.46)
500m<dist<1000m -0.275* -0.295**
(-1.95) (-2.19)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.307** -0.042
(-2.30) (-0.33)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.170 -0.038
(-1.24) (-0.33)
Control
- Borrowers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Loan contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
- Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Credit officer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 16,192 16,192 16,192 16,192 16,175 16,175 16,175 16,175
Nb. Borrowers 9,770 9,770 9,770 9,770 7,283 7,283 7,283 7,283
R2 (within) 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.031 0.033 0.031 0.034
Panel C: Number of employees
Small firms (Nb. Empl.<Median) Large firms (Nb. Empl.>Median)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.062 0.295***
(-0.87) (4.93)
Log(distance) 0.046 0.247***
(1.08) (3.43)
Dummy -0.071* -0.202***
(-1.91) (-3.10)
dist<500m -0.287** -0.580**
(-2.45) (-2.17)
500m<dist<1000m -0.246** -0.260
(-2.41) (-0.94)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.121 -0.122
(-1.24) (-0.46)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.049 0.012
(-0.41) (0.16)
Control
- Borrowers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Loan contract Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
- Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Credit officer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
- Period Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 23,477 23,477 23,477 23,477 8,890 8,890 8,890 8,890
Nb. Borrowers 12,488 12,488 12,488 12,488 4,623 4,623 4,623 4,623
R2 (within) 0.052 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.050 0.049 0.046 0.046
The dependent variables is total amount of loan. The sample is divided according to the age of the firm (panel
A), total sales (panel B) and the number of employees (panel C). Within estimator is used and period- and
industry-dummies as well as control variables (sales, number of employees, and firm age) are included in all
specifications. Other loan terms (maturity, rate and collateral ratio) are included as controls in columns [3],
[4], [7] and [8]. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Standardized coefficients are reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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6.2 Additional econometric issue
In addition to identification issue, our econometric model is subject to alternative poten-
tial problems, including sample selection, omitted variable, attrition, or sample depen-
dence. We present some tests that tackle these different issues.
6.2.1 Sample selection issue
From an empirical perspective, our estimates are subject to a sample selection bias.
Indeed our partner only provided GPS information for half of the clients in our study.
There is no explicit rule to determine which clients are chosen and which are not. However,
the choice to select some clients and exclude others is certainly a non-random decision.
For instance, in the Appendix (Table A2) we show that older clients and borrowers
with larger loans are more likely to be geolocated than others. In econometric terms,
we suspect a sample selection issue that may bias results. Heckman (1979) provides a
simple way to test and control for sample selection in cross-sectional data. However,
this issue is more complex for panel data with fixed effects.28 Different parametrical and
non-parametrical methods have been developed. In this paper, we follow the three-step
methodology proposed by Wooldridge (1995).29 Results are displayed in Appendix (Table
A3). In Panel A, we show models explaining the loan amount. Coefficients associated
with λˆ are not statistically significant, indicating the absence of a sample selection bias.
In addition, results regarding distance variables are unchanged in both econometric and
economic terms. In a second step we correct for sample selection for model explaining
the collateral-to-loan ratio. The inverse of the Mills ratio (λˆ) is significant at 10%,
indicating that the model is potentially subject to sample selection bias. In spite of it, our
conclusions are not altered, and even reinforced, when we control for sample selection.
6.2.2 Inclusion of the distance between the lender and the closest competing
bank
In spatial models, lending conditions may depend on three parameters (see Degryse and
Ongena, 2005): (i) the distance between the borrower and the lender, (ii) the distance
28Because our identification strategy is based on the inclusion of fixed effects, we cannot remove them.
29Technical details regarding the methodology are provided in the Appendix B.
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between the borrower and the closest competing lender; and, (iii) the number of competi-
tors. In our baseline model, we control for the distance between the borrower and the
closest competing bank (interest variable) and for the distance between the borrower and
the lender (by adding borrower fixed effects). However, we cannot control for the number
of competitors due to a lack of data. While we do not believe that this could affect our
findings, one might argue that the distance between the lender and the closest competing
bank may capture changes in the number of competitors. In the following, we try to
test whether our findings are sensitive to that point.30 Unfortunately, we have limited
information on the total number of lenders, especially other MFIs. Nonetheless, we add
the distance between the lender (our partner’s agency) and the closest competing bank.
This distance is an imperfect proxy of the competitive pressure induced by the presence
of alternative lender in the vicinity and we expect that a reduction signals an increase
in the number of competitors. Results, displayed in Appendix (Table A4), show that
our findings are insensitive to the inclusion of this new control variable. In addition, the
distance between the lender and the closest competing bank is no significantly correlated
with credit contract terms.
6.2.3 Excluding Access Banque and Microcred
Banking system in Madagscar groups together traditional commercial banks, commercial
banks with specific products dedicated to small firms (such as Bank of Africa) and former
MFIs transform in banks (such as Access Banque and Microcred). One might argue that
our results are only driven by former actors only. To control for this point, we compute
alternative measures of distance by excluding Access Banque and Microcred. Results,
displayed in Table A5, provide interesting findings. In Panel A, we focus on determinants
of loan amount. Coefficients associated with distance have the expected sign, even not
always statistically significant at the usual thresholds. When we concentrate on collateral
ratio, the impact of distance remains significant, even if its economic impact is reduced.
In other words, results in Appendix (Table A5) indicate that only a part of the effect is
driven by Access Banque and Microcred. Put differently, other (traditional) banks also
compete with our partner MFI.
30We already provide a way to treat this issue when we add municipality-semester dummies.
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6.2.4 Attrition and sample dependence
Our result can be driven by attrition and specific sub-samples. We tackle these two issues
in the following. To be ascertain that our findings are not driven by attrition issue, we
adopt a simple framework. We consider only individuals for which we have data in the
last year (2014) and rerun the baseline model on this sub-sample. Results displayed in
Appendix (Table A6) show that this issue does not seem to bias our findings. Finally,
the average number of observations per borrower is 2.18 and for some of them we have
only one observation. We rerun the model by excluding these borrowers and our findings
are unchanged as shown in Table A7 in Appendix.
7 Discussion
Our findings suggest that MFIs and regular banks do not operate in strictly segmented
markets as often believed but rather tend to compete (at least for the most transparent
borrowers). An unresolved question is whether the upscaling strategy developed by MFIs
is good or bad new for borrowers. On the one hand, this strategy may enable MFIs
to become more profitable and therefore to improve financial inclusion for the poorest
entrepreneurs (cross-subsidization strategy). In addition, competition could actually lead
to better loan conditions for small business owners. On the other hand, offering better
conditions for the most transparent MSEs can have negative implications for the most
opaque firms due to mission drift.
A large body of literature has raised concerns about the commercialization of micro-
finance and the risk that MFIs will neglect poor people, as wealthier clients cost less31
(Morduch, 2000). Mission drift is a process along which MFIs increase the average size
of the loan granted, not for progressive lending or cross-subsidization purposes32, but
only to maximize their financial profit (Armenda´riz and Szafarz, 2011). In other words,
31Insofar as intermediation activity induces sunk costs, it is more profitable to finance one large loan
rather than multiple small loans. It is worth noting that generally MFIs fail to reach the poorest people
(Navajas et al., 2000; Lønborg and Rasmussen, 2014).
32Progressive lending refers to the idea that existing clients can reach out higher credit ceilings after
observing a clean repayment record at the end of each credit cycle. Cross-subsidization, which consists
of reaching out to unbanked wealthier clients in order to finance a larger number of poor clients whose
average loan size is relatively small.
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profit is the goal in itself, not the means to reduce poverty among ”unbankable” people.
Empirical proof is scarce, mainly because using the average loan size as a proxy for the
poverty level of MFI clients does not allow researchers to distinguish cross-subsidization
from ”mission drift” (Armenda´riz and Szafarz, 2011). In this work, we document that
our partner MFI tends to follow the growth of its largest clients, especially when these
clients can be grabbed by a bank. One might ask whether this trend reflects a form of
mission drift and negatively affects the most opaque firms. To provide an indirect answer,
we compute the average characteristics of our partner MFI’s new clients by semester be-
tween 2008 and 2014. According to the mission drift hypothesis, we would expect our
partner to serve less opaque firms over time (due to competitive pressure induced by bank
network expansion over time). However, results, reported in the Appendix (Table A8)33,
do not support this hypothesis. Our partner has not stopped offering loans to opaque
firms. On the contrary, it tended to serve more opaque clients (smaller firms) in 2014
than in 2008. Obviously, these simple descriptive statistics are not a definitive answer
but are in line with recent evidence indicating the absence of mission drift (Cull et al.,
2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). These figures show that a MFI may offer better loan
conditions to its better clients without limiting its outreach.
Beyond mission drift that affects on credit access by the lower tier of borrowers, the
upscaling strategy employed by MFIs might also negatively affect the upper tier of bor-
rowers due to a hold-up effect that could prevent micro and small enterprises (MSEs) from
obtaining more attractive bank financing (that is often cheaper and has more attractive
features, such as longer maturities). In fact, by granting large loan amounts with less
administrative requirements than banks (such as proof of sound accounting practices),
MFIs may unintentionally discourage MSEs from applying for formal loans. This could
have detrimental effects on economic development directly, by hindering investment, or
indirectly, for example by by providing MSEs fewer incentives to formalize. However,
this view assumes that successful MSEs will apply for a formal loan. Due to the lack of
data, we cannot provide evidence confirming or denying the hold-up effect. Additional
33We consider all clients (not only those used in the paper). For each semester, we compute the
average size (total sales and employees), the average age, and the average amount of loans granted for
new clients (those without a previous relationship with our partner MFI). Depending upon the median,
the first quartile or the first decile provides a similar conclusion.
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investigation is needed.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the respective strategies of upscaling and downscaling
initiated by MFIs and commercial banks, have resulted in competition between them. We
study whether firms located in the vicinity of a bank obtain better loan conditions from
an MFI than they would otherwise. Our intuition is based on the idea that an MFI will
offer better loan conditions to keep its clients, only if MFIs and banks are in competition.
In absence of competition bank proximity should not affect loan conditions offered by
MFIs.
To test whether bank proximity affect loan conditions, we employ an original panel
data set of 32,374 loans granted to 14,834 borrowers granted by one of the major MFIs in
Madagascar over the period 2008-2014. A challenge is to go beyond a simple correlation
and provide causal interpretation. Due to the lack of data, we cannot rely on instrumental
variable strategy. Our identification strategy is based on the inclusion of borrower fixed
effects that allows us to control for all time-invariant variables that affect both borrower’s
location and borrower’s performance and credit conditions. In other words, we exploit
only within variation (a change in distance for same borrower over time) and not between
variation (differences in distance between borrowers). In robustness checks, we adopt
alternative strategies. We firstly add municipality-semester dummies. This strategy
allows us to control for time-varying unobserved factors that could affect banks’ decision
to locate and borrowers’ performance occurring at the municipality level. We also focus
only on borrowers that experienced reduction in distance to be ascertain that we capture
within variation. Finally, we apply a test based on economic intuition. We investigate
whether the impact of distance is stronger for transparent firms. The impact of bank
presence must be stronger for these borrowers. All tests confirm our baseline results and
give us much confidence in our causal interpretation.
We find that the proximity of a bank to an MFI client increased the size of the MFI
loan obtained and decreased collateral requirements. These results are statistically and
economically significant. For instance, firms located in a circle of less than 500 meters to
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the nearest bank obtain, on average, $200 more than firms located beyond two kilometers.
Results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests considering alternative identification
strategy, sample selection issue (because only a half of borrowers is geolocated), and
alternative specifications. In addition, findings are stronger for transparent firms (well-
established and larger firms) in line with our intuition.
We interpret these effects in terms of competition. Our results suggest that these two
financial intermediaries actually do compete and that their markets overlap, contrary to
the common view. Although previous works have studied the impact of bank development
on the composition of MFI portfolios, to our knowledge we are the first to focus on
an MFI’s reaction in terms of lending conditions. Our findings have important policy
implications for access to finance in low-income countries. Favoring the upscaling stategy
of MFIs and/or the downscaling strategy of banks could improve access to credit for the
largest MFI clients. Our results suggest that these firms could obtain larger loans with
less collateral. In addition, a shock in one market (microfinance or banking) may have
unexpected consequences for the other market.
Our findings also raise several questions that offer interesting ideas for future research.
First, our results are valid in the specific context under investigation here, namely Mada-
gascar and our partner MFI. One challenge for future research is to examine whether the
effects documented by our analysis hold in different contexts (external validity). Second,
in the last section, we raise concerns about the implications of our findings. Although our
results can be read optimistically, they can also be interpreted in more nuanced terms.
On the one hand, there is a risk of hold-up by MFIs for the most transparent borrow-
ers. On the other hand, less transparent firms could be neglected due to mission drift.
Additional investigation is required to test the existence of both effects.
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Appendix A Additional Tables
Table A1: Keeping firms having relationship with MFI since 2010 (or before)
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.048*** -0.046***
(-3.30) (-3.36)
Log(distance) -0.044** -0.034**
(-2.23) (-1.98)
Dummy 0.020*** 0.015**
(2.86) (2.43)
dist<500m 0.042** 0.033*
(2.02) (1.71)
500m<dist<1000m 0.035* 0.019
(1.80) (1.07)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.006 -0.007
(-0.40) (-0.49)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.004 -0.003
(-0.48) (-0.39)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061
Nb. Borrowers 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069
R2 (within) 0.083 0.277 0.083 0.277 0.083 0.277 0.083 0.277
Panel B: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.053 0.047
(0.75) (0.68)
Log(distance) 0.114*** 0.110***
(2.86) (2.75)
Dummy -0.053*** -0.051***
(-4.03) (-3.85)
dist<500m -0.132*** -0.128***
(-3.57) (-3.44)
500m<dist<1000m -0.108*** -0.104***
(-3.04) (-2.93)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.040 -0.042
(-1.35) (-1.41)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.008 -0.009
(-0.37) (-0.39)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061 14,061
Nb. Borrowers 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069 3,069
R2 (within) 0.029 0.036 0.031 0.037 0.031 0.037 0.031 0.037
The dependent variables are the total amount of loan (Panel A) and the collateral-to-loan ratio (Panel B). Within
estimator is used. The list of control variables includes total sales (in constant US$), the number of employees, the
firm age, the number of loan between the firm and our partner IMF). In columns [2], [4], [6] and [8], we also add other
contract terms. In all specifications, we include town-period dummies, credit officer dummies and industry-dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standardized coefficients
are reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A2: t-test
Geolocated t-test
All Yes No (p-value)
Loan characteristics
Amount† 1057.9 1176.1 926.6 <0.01
Rate 11.46 12.60 10.20 <0.01
Maturity 387.6 389.3 385.6 <0.01
Collateral/Amount 2.80 2.86 2.73 <0.01
Security/Collateral 54.0 54.4 53.6 <0.01
Business characteristics
Sales† 1719.7 1789.6 1641.3 <0.01
Employees 2.19 2.27 2.11 <0.01
Age (firm) 8.36 8.84 7.82 <0.01
Leding relationship
Number 2.78 2.92 2.63 <0.01
Years 2.13 2.29 1.95 <0.01
# Obs. 61,953 32,374 29,579
† Data in deflated USD
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Table A3: Determinants of loan amount, Wooldridge procedure (sample selection)
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.054*** -0.051***
(-4.96) (3.27)
log(distance) -0.046** -0.037**
(-2.00) (-2.58)
Dummy 77.65* 60.27*
(1.85) (1.79)
Dist<500m 280.21* 215.66*
(1.65) (1.64)
500m<dist<1000m 188.02 107.00
(0.77) (0.52)
1000m<dist<1500m 41.83 53.17
(0.38) (0.70)
1500m<dist<2000m 20.40 13.22
(0.44) (0.35)
λˆ NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.081 0.271 0.081 0.271 0.081 0.271 0.081 0.271
Panel B: Collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.054 0.048
(1.31) (1.18)
log(distance) 0.109*** 0.104***
(3.44) (3.37)
Dummy -0.128*** -0.122***
(-6.87) (-6.28)
Dist<500m -0.397*** -0.378***
(-4.79) (-5.14)
500m<dist<1000m -0.278*** -0.264***
(-4.82) (-4.50)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.121** -0.124**
(-1.99) (-2.00)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.0520 -0.0539
(-0.99) (-1.05)
λˆ p<0.10 p<0.10 p<0.10 p<0.10 p<0.10 p<0.10 p<0.10 p<0.10
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374 32374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.070 0.075 0.071 0.076 0.071 0.076 0.071 0.075
The dependent variable is the total loan amount (in deflated USD). The table shows estimations with four different
measures of distance (for categories distance, the omitted category is distance above 2,000 meters). Three-step procedure
developed by Wooldridge (1995) is employed (see Appendix B for details). Period, industry and credit officer dummies
as well as control variables (sales, employees, age, loan number) are included in all specifications. Standard errors
are clustered at the borrower level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standardized coefficients are reported
for continuous variables (distance, log and control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and
categories). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. For λˆ, we report the p-value (NS:
non significant at 10%, p<0.10)
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Table A4: Inclusion of the distance between MFI agency and the closest bank
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.052*** -0.051***
(-3.24) (-3.37)
Log(distance) -0.044* -0.037*
(-1.80) (-1.73)
Dummy 77.15** 60.30**
(2.29) (2.01)
dist<500m 274.25* 212.57
(1.84) (1.58)
500m<dist<1000m 184.03* 103.53
(1.67) (1.04)
1000m<dist<1500m -45.51 -56.84
(-0.49) (-0.68)
1500m<dist<2000m -22.70 -16.37
(-0.35) (-0.28)
Distance IMF-bank -0.018 -0.018 -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 -0.011
(-0.87) (-0.88) (-0.23) (-0.37) (-0.41) (-0.56) (-0.21) (-0.47)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.079 0.272 0.079 0.272 0.078 0.272 0.080 0.272
Panel B: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.048 0.042
(0.68) (0.61)
Log(distance) 0.097** 0.092**
(2.44) (2.32)
Dummy -0.118*** -0.113***
(-3.67) (-3.52)
dist<500m -0.358*** -0.340***
(-3.17) (-2.99)
500m<dist<1000m -0.245** -0.231**
(-2.51) (-2.37)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.100 -0.099
(-1.06) (-1.11)
1500m<dist<2000m -0.037 -0.039
(-0.44) (-0.46)
Distance IMF-bank 0.111* 0.110* 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.069 0.070
(1.92) (1.91) (1.30) (1.31) (1.36) (1.37) (1.17) (1.19)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.029 0.035 0.030 0.035 0.030 0.035 0.030 0.035
The dependent variables are the total amount of loan (Panel A) and the collateral-to-loan ratio (Panel B). Within
estimator is used. The list of control variables includes total sales (in constant US$), the number of employees, the
firm age, the number of loan between the firm and our partner IMF). In columns [2], [4], [6] and [8], we also add other
contract terms. In all specifications, we include town-period dummies, credit officer dummies, industry-dummies
and control variables (sales, employees, age, number of loans). Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous
variables (distance, log and control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories).
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
41
Table A5: Exclusion of Access Banque and Microcred
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.030 -0.035
(-1.08) (-1.54)
Log(distance) -0.041 -0.022
(-1.26) (-0.83)
Dummy 102.19** 67.41*
(2.54) (1.85)
dist<500m 298.52* 192.14
(1.64) (1.21)
500m<dist<1000m 210.40* 117.20
(1.75) (1.06)
1000m<dist<1500m 51.96 8.96
(0.51) (0.09)
1500m<dist<2000m 88.15 81.46
(1.10) (1.09)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.078 0.270 0.078 0.270 0.078 0.270 0.078 0.270
Panel B: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.057 0.054
(0.67) (0.65)
Log(distance) 0.150*** 0.146***
(4.25) (4.10)
Dummy -0.163*** -0.156***
(-4.58) (-4.41)
dist<500m -0.430*** -0.410***
(-3.96) (-3.75)
500m<dist<1000m -0.246** -0.231**
(-2.48) (-2.32)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.113 -0.110
(-1.13) (-1.10)
1500m<dist<2000m 0.006 0.011
(0.06) (0.12)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374 32,374
Nb. Borrowers 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834 14,834
R2 (within) 0.030 0.035 0.031 0.036 0.031 0.036 0.031 0.037
The dependent variables are the total amount of loan (Panel A) and the collateral-to-loan ratio (Panel B). Within
estimator is used. The list of control variables includes total sales (in constant US$), the number of employees, the
firm age, the number of loan between the firm and our partner IMF). In columns [2], [4], [6] and [8], we also add other
contract terms. In all specifications, we include town-period dummies, credit officer dummies, industry-dummies
and control variables (sales, employees, age, number of loans). Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous
variables (distance, log and control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories).
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A6: Attrition (keeping borrowers with data for 2014)
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.078*** -0.070***
(-3.53) (-3.40)
Log(distance) -0.080** -0.060**
(-2.18) (-2.09)
Dummy 0.020** 0.016**
(2.50) (2.39)
dist<500m 0.097** 0.074**
(2.40) (2.18)
500m<dist<1000m 0.079** 0.059**
(2.41) (2.11)
1000m<dist<1500m 0.009 0.006
(0.36) (0.27)
1500m<dist<2000m 0.005 0.006
(0.38) (0.58)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962
Nb. Borrowers 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414
R2 (within) 0.081 0.267 0.082 0.267 0.081 0.267 0.083 0.268
Panel B: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.028 -0.033
(-0.24) (-0.32)
Log(distance) 0.070 0.063
(1.23) (1.11)
Dummy -0.019* -0.017*
(-1.88) (-1.74)
dist<500m -0.102** -0.093*
(-2.02) (-1.84)
500m<dist<1000m -0.070 -0.063
(-1.51) (-1.34)
1000m<dist<1500m -0.010 -0.010
(-0.26) (-0.25)
1500m<dist<2000m 0.008 0.008
(0.28) (0.28)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962 18,962
Nb. Borrowers 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414 8,414
R2 (within) 0.036 0.041 0.036 0.042 0.036 0.042 0.037 0.042
The dependent variables are the total amount of loan (Panel A) and the collateral-to-loan ratio (Panel B). Within
estimator is used. The list of control variables includes total sales (in constant US$), the number of employees, the
firm age, the number of loan between the firm and our partner IMF). In columns [2], [4], [6] and [8], we also add other
contract terms. In all specifications, we include town-period dummies, credit officer dummies, industry-dummies
and control variables (sales, employees, age, number of loans). Standardized coefficients are reported for continuous
variables (distance, log and control variables) and usual coefficients for binary variables (dummy and categories).
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Table A7: Keeping firms having at least two observations
Panel A: Determinants of amount of loan
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance -0.049*** -0.048***
(-3.29) (-3.42)
log(distance) -0.042* -0.036*
(-1.91) (-1.85)
Dummy 78.73** 62.36**
(2.45) (2.16)
500m<d<1000m 277.96** 220.27*
(1.97) (1.72)
1000m<d<1500m 187.15* 110.03
(1.81) (1.18)
1500m<d<2000m -42.76 -51.32
(-0.48) (-0.63)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431
Nb. Borrowers 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891
R2 (within) 0.0787 0.270 0.0786 0.270 0.0786 0.270 0.0795 0.271
Panel B: Determinants of collateral ratio
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Distance 0.050 0.044
(0.75) (0.67)
log(distance) 0.104*** 0.099***
(2.74) (2.62)
Dummy -0.126*** -0.121***
(-4.00) (-3.84)
500m<d<1000m -0.386*** -0.368***
(-3.53) (-3.36)
1000m<d<1500m -0.268*** -0.255***
(-2.80) (-2.66)
1500m<d<2000m -0.116 -0.119
(-1.29) (-1.34)
Loan contract No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs. 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431 25431
Nb. Borrowers 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891 7891
R2 (within) 0.0787 0.270 0.0786 0.270 0.0786 0.270 0.0795 0.271
The dependent variables are the total amount of loan (Panel A) and the collateral-to-loan ratio (Panel B). Within
estimator is used. The list of control variables includes total sales (in constant US$), the number of employees, the
firm age, the number of loan between the firm and our partner IMF). In columns [2], [4], [6] and [8], we also add other
contract terms. In all specifications, we include town-period dummies, credit officer dummies and industry-dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standardized coefficients
are reported. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table A8: Mission Drift, indirect test
Semester Amount Sales Employees Age Amount/Sales
2008-S1 812.61 2034.24 2.35 5.69 139.32
2008-S2 808.40 2312.22 2.58 5.31 125.61
2009-S1 734.27 2124.27 2.33 5.61 116.82
2009-S2 674.59 1473.53 2.00 5.18 140.81
2010-S1 847.77 1841.76 2.33 6.09 169.71
2010-S2 952.05 1721.47 2.16 5.41 166.03
2011-S1 804.67 1708.07 2.25 5.85 169.08
2011-S2 723.59 1444.38 2.13 6.56 154.53
2012-S1 859.07 1477.45 1.88 8.02 159.85
2012-S2 847.25 1452.52 1.67 5.60 192.05
2013-S1 963.07 1542.13 1.70 6.55 189.95
2013-S2 973.56 1529.72 1.83 7.11 230.66
2014-S1 782.67 1197.94 1.76 6.92 213.12
2014-S2 800.77 1222.80 1.73 7.48 209.60
The table reports the average value of amount, total sales, number of
employees, age and the ratio of amount to sales to new clients (those
that never obtain previous loan from our partner) by semester. Fi-
nancial data are deflated using the CPI and reported in dollar (1
Ariary=3,144 $US)
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Appendix B Three-step Wooldridge procedure
Due to localization of only half of clients, our estimates are subject to a potential sample
selection issue. Different parametrical and non-parametrical methods have been devel-
oped to control for sample selection in fixed-effect model (for remainder, our identification
strategy is based on the inclusion of borrower fixed effect). In this paper we employ the
three-step procedure proposed by Wooldridge (1995). In the following, we briefly present
this method.
In a first step, for each period (here, semester) we estimate a selection equation using
a standard probit as follows:
Pr(si = 1) = Φ(∆Xi + γZj + ηs) (∀t = 0, . . . , T ) (3)
where si is a dummy equals 1 if a borrower is geolocated and 0 otherwise, and Zj is
a selection variable and Xi the list of control variables include in the baseline model
(without/with other credit terms). The selection variable must be strongly correlated
with the selection rule (here, the likelihood to be geolocated) but not with outcome
(here, credit conditions faced by agent i). As selection variable (Zj), we use the share of
geolocated clients by credit officer j, defined as follows:34
Zj =
Nb of geolocated clients in the pool of agent j
Total nb. of clients in the pool of agent j
We compute the selection variable Zj for each period. In Equation 3 we include neither
borrower fixed effects (µi) nor period fixed effect (νt) because we estimate the model per
period and we have only one observation by borrower for each period. In addition, we
exclude credit officer dummies (τj) because this variable is strongly correlated with Zj
(even perfectly correlated when we do not exclude borrower i to compute Zj). In Figure
A1, we report the estimated γˆ per period as well as confidence interval. We observe that
our selection variable is always positive and highly significant in all periods.35
34We exclude borrower i in the computation of this ratio. But this modification does not change our
results.
35We extend this model by adding alternative contract terms when we consider these variables in our
outcome equation. Results are highly similar for selection variable.
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In a second step, we compute the inverse of the Mills ratio for each borrower i for
each semester t as follows:
λˆi =
φ(∆ˆXi + γˆZj + ηˆs)
Φ(∆ˆXi + γˆZj + ηˆs)
(∀t = 0, . . . , T ) (4)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function and φ(.) the density normal
function.
In a third step, we re-estimate the baseline model (Eq. 1) by adding the estimated
inverse Mills ratio as covariates. Insofar as λˆi is computed for each period by running a
probit model by period, we use a time-variant measure of the inverse of Mills ratio (λˆit)
allowing us to include usual borrower and time fixed-effects as follows:
yit = βdit + ∆Xit + ρλˆit + µi + νt + ηs + τj + it (5)
According to Wooldridge (1995), a simple test to detect sample selection consists of the
t-statistics for ρ. Under the null hypothesis (absence of bias) ρ is statistically equal to
0. If ρ 6= 0, we need to correct for sample selection bias. In this case, we cannot use
standard errors because λˆit is a generated variable. A simple way to get robust standard
errors is by applying the bootstrapping method.
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Figure A1: Estimated parameters of selection variable in selection equation
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